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The post-tsunami reconstruction in Aceh, Indonesia, resulted in more than 3600km of road section reconstructed. The ownerships 
of the reconstructed road assets were transferred back to the Local Governments for the operational and maintenance needs. 
Hence, the responsibility to maintain most of the road sections are now held by the Local Governments. This paper examines the 
impacts of the local political and socio-economic condition to the capacity of the Local Governments in the maintenance of post-
disaster road reconstruction assets in Aceh, Indonesia. Twenty-eight semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
representatives of road infrastructure stakeholders at the local, provincial and national level. The analysis reveals the main 
political and socio-economic factors affecting the capacity of the Local Governments in road maintenance. 
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1. Introduction 
In the event of a major natural disaster, the road infrastructure sector often suffers from the greatest damage and 
losses. In the event of earthquake and tsunami on December 26th, 2004 in Aceh, Indonesia, the disaster destroyed 
more than 2700km of road networks. Within the four year of reconstruction activities, however, more than 3600km 
of road networks were rehabilitated and reconstructed (Sihombing, 2009). In the post-tsunami reconstruction in 
Aceh, most of the road reconstruction projects were funded and implemented either by the national government or 
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donor agencies. Upon completion, the reconstructed assets were transferred back to the respective governments. 
Since most of the reconstructed road networks were district roads, there are concerns over the maintenance of the 
reconstructed road assets at the district level. This paper, which is based on an ongoing PhD study, discusses issues 
identified in the maintenance of the district roads, particularly with regards to the impact of the local political and 
socio-economic condition to the capacity of the Local Government in the maintenance of the road infrastructure. 
1. Methodology 
The scope of study is focused on three districts in Aceh province included as the case studies; Aceh Besar, Aceh 
Jaya, and Aceh Barat Daya. Between January and April 2013, twenty-eight semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with road infrastructure stakeholders at the national, provincial and the local levels which were involved 
in the reconstruction of road infrastructure activities in the three case study districts. The basic profile of the 
interviewees is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 – Basic profile of the interviewees 
Agency Local Provincial National Total 
Consultant - 1 4 5 
Contractors - 3 - 3 
Donor Agency - - 1 1 
Transport - 1 - 1 
Planning Agency 3 2 1 6 
Public Works 6 1 2 9 
Disaster Management - - 3 3 
Total 9 8 11 28 
 
The interviewees were selected using a combination of purposive sampling and a snowballing method. The semi-
structured interviews were conducted in a face-to-face approach. Prior to the interviews, the prospective 
interviewees were briefed about the purpose of the study and the topics of the interviews. Each of the interviewees 
was advised to subscribe the Participant Consent Form which allowed the interviews to be voice-recorded and that 
interview results, and respondent profiles would be kept with strict confidentiality. The locations and time of the 
interviews were selected and agreed by both the researcher and the interviewees. The interview result was 
transcribed into nVivo 10, and the content analysis was also conducted using the aid of the same software. The 
transcriptions were coded using multiple stages approach; open coding, axial coding and selective coding process. In 
the open coding process, information from the interviews was coded and named based on the main ideas of the 
emerging information. At the later phase, the axial coding, the nodes were then classified and grouped into relevant 
themes. Once the axial coding process is finished, the transcription codes were exported to Microsoft word for 
further elaboration and discussions. Information from the transcription was selected based on its appropriateness and 
relevance to the themes. Accordingly, this process is called selective coding. The analysis of data was then classified 
and presented in a series of matrices of themes and the case study locations. 
2. Main findings 
As shown in Table 2, from the local political and socio-economic perspective, the road maintenance affecting 
factors emerging from the interview analysis include the high preference on capital projects, parliament budgeting 
authority, political stability (political), as well as distribution of wealth, corruption, community lack of sense of 
ownership, and economic consideration (socio-economic). Moreover, the political preference on capital projects and 
the impact of parliament budgeting authority were perceived by most of the interviewees as the political factors 
affecting the Local Government capacity in the road maintenance. These issues were highlighted by nine and eight 
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interviewees respectively. The importance of political stability was also seen as the affecting factor in road 
maintenance and the issue was raised by two interviewees.  
From the socio-economic perspective, the need to distribute wealth was perceived by 11 interviewees as the most 
affecting factors in the road maintenance efforts by the Local Governments. The issue of corruption, community’s 
lack of sense of ownership towards the road infrastructure, and the economic consideration in the development 
planning and decision making were raised by four, three and two interviewees respectively.  
Table 2 – Road maintenance affecting factors 
Affecting factors Number of Respondents 
Parliament budgeting authority 8 
Preference on capital projects 9 
Political stability 2 
Distribution of wealth 11 
Corruption 4 
Community's lack of sense of ownership 3 
Economic consideration 2 
 
3. Discussion 
3.1. Political impact 
The impacts of the political condition to the Local Governments’ road maintenance capacity can be grouped into 
several categories. In general, the political impacts were perceived to be rooted to the parliament budgeting 
authority, the high preference on the capital projects, and the perceived importance of political stability. Each of 
these issues will be elaborated in the following sections.  
3.1.1. The parliament budgeting authority 
In the decentralised system of Indonesia, the parliament holds the budgeting authority. According to Law no 
27/2009 article 343, (Law, 2009b), the local parliament has three main functions, namely legislation, budgeting and 
the monitoring of law implementation and use of budget allocation. Since the parliament holds the authority to 
approve the budget proposal, this eventually resulted in the parliament intervening the development projects and 
programs prepared by the Local Governments. The budgeting authority of the parliament, designed as a means to 
incorporate and convey the community’s aspiration in the development program, ultimately affected the 
development planning. In practice, however, on the basis of delivering community aspiration, this resulted in the 
budget proposal prepared by the government being pushed to meet the parliament request, which could otherwise be 
rejected. Additionally, as explained by LG02, the budget proposal prepared by the Local Government need to be 
distributed and represent the various election zones of the parliament members, often disregarding the existing 
development plan and priorities. 
Accordingly, ADB (2003) identifies that the decision-making process in the developing countries tend to be 
intentionally subjective and political, based on consensus and requiring discussion, committees and compromise. To 
a certain extent, this was in fact part of the purposes of the decentralised system in Indonesia, which is expected to 
be the instrument that encourage broader participations of citizens and ultimately lead to increased efficiency and 
improved governance (Jütting et al., 2005). The decentralised system was then expected to provide the community 
with “much more independent in electing their own leaders, promoting their own interests, developing their own 
institutions, initiating their own policies, managing their own financial resources, and mobilizing support from their 
own communities” (Rasyid, 2004). However, as highlighted by Ahmad and Mansoor (2002), the demand for 
decentralisation in Indonesia is not primarily driven by a perceived need to improve local service delivery, but more 
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by a desire to have control over resource and political and legal autonomy. Consequently, along with the 
decentralisation of authorities, the decentralisation process has been argued to be a process of ‘decentralisation of 
the corruption, collusion and nepotism practices to the local level (Darmawan, 2008), which affect the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of the government (Mahfud cited in Daslani, 2012).  
As with the case study districts, the political pressure is experienced widely with regards to the decision making 
process. In particular, the budgeting authority of the parliament resulted in political interference to the development 
program prepared by the Local Governments and, in particular, the road maintenance planning. Consequently, since 
the parliament holds the right to refuse the budget proposal, the Local Governments tend to accommodate the 
parliament requests to avoid political disputes and delays in the budget approval process. This was confirmed by 
LG03-AB as he described that the Planning Agency practically cannot enforce and implement what are in their 
development planning and program, unless they are approved by the parliament. Therefore, whilst, on the one hand 
road maintenance activities received limited budget allocation, the limited road maintenance allocation would also 
need to be distributed based on the political interest. As a consequence, such pressure resulted in the budget proposal 
unnecessarily reflect the development plan prepared by the planners and that the approved maintenance budget 
allocation may not reflect the actual road maintenance needs, but rather filled with a list of aspirations and demands 
from the politicians which may and may not be in accordance with the development plan.  
In addition to the issues related to the budgeting authority of the parliament as discussed above, the political 
impact on the road maintenance was also experienced resulting from the high preference of the politician, as well as 
road authority, on the capital projects. More discussion will be presented in the following.  
3.1.2. Preference on capital projects 
As highlighted by ADB (2003) the value of the project, the relatively more sophisticated level of the work, and 
the immediate impact of a capital project is more politically and technically interesting for the politicians, as well as 
for the road engineers. As explained by PG01, the decision on the final budget allocation will be determined in the 
budget discussion session between the government and the parliament. Since maintenance needs frequently get low 
priority, the final budget allocation often resulted in the postponement of maintenance works to the following year, 
as an excuse to the limited budget availability in the running year and the competition with other sectors. Levik 
(2001) argues that in most countries, investing money in building new roads is more politically favourable. Road 
maintenance is less politically attractive when compared with new road construction, road rehabilitation or the social 
programmes, which provide more ‘visible’ impacts and therefore offer greater political benefits (UNESCAP, 2005, 
Donnges et al., 2007). This confirms the findings from the case study districts where political intervention did not 
only occur in form of shifting development plan towards certain development sectors, but also in determining the 
project types and location. Donnges et al. (2007) argue that such condition is particularly affected by the limited 
tenure of the politicians in their office.  
Nevertheless, the poor maintenance budget allocation and distribution are not solely due to the political pressure. 
In the case study districts, the low political interest on the road maintenance is worsened by the fact that the road 
engineers and professional also perceived road maintenance works as being inferior to road construction. According 
to Robinson and Stiedl (2001) such condition is one of the consequences resulting from a decentralised system 
which erratically places responsibility for road maintenance to incompetent organisation. Additionally, as 
emphasised by Estache and Sinha (1994), decentralisation tends to increase government expenditure on 
infrastructure, possibly due to different preferences on quality and quantity of infrastructure between the national 
and the regional government. 
In accordance with the above arguments, the importance of road maintenance did not seem to be well-perceived 
by the road authorities of the case study districts. The relatively small value of road maintenance projects was not 
seen as interesting works by the engineers in the road authorities. CO05 explained that due to the small value of 
maintenance works, the road authorities tended to wait until the damage level has escalated to a level where the 
value of the repair works are considered worth working for. Supporting the above argument, LG05 similarly 
suggested that the road authority appeared to have a little interest on the maintenance works as the project value was 
relatively small. As a representative of the public works agency, LG05-BD stated that the damages to the road 
infrastructure were too small to be included as a project. Regarding this issue, Donnges et al. (2007) identify the 
issue that road maintenance does not seem to offer an interesting career path for the engineers. Such a preference, 
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according to UNESCAP (2005), is one of the factors which complicates the efforts to raise sufficient maintenance 
funds and is considered as one of the main constraints in maintaining road assets.  
3.1.3. Political stability 
Another issue emerging from the interviews was that political stability was one of the main considerations in the 
decision-making process. This view was illustrated by DO01 and the NG02 as the following. Firstly, for the foreign-
funded district road projects, MoU between BRR and the Local Governments were required prior to the project 
commencement. Accordingly, the respective Local Governments agreed and provided the required maintenance 
allocation as stipulated in the MoU. Secondly, however, the maintenance allocation was provided for the first year 
only. For the next following year, the Local Governments refused to provide the maintenance allocation and based 
their refusal on the legal requirement that budget allocation can only be used for assets listed in their asset inventory. 
Therefore, before the legal project documentation has been completed and that the road assets have been formally 
transferred back to the Local Governments, they would not provide maintenance allocation.  
However, the two occasions were, in fact, contradictory. The Local Governments and the parliament were 
initially able to provide the maintenance allocation for the first year despite the transfer of assets had not been 
completed. For the second year, they refused to provide the maintenance allocation, referring to the legal 
requirement as the excuse. As DO01 described, “With regards to the funding (for the road maintenance needs) of the 
first year, I do not know how, but somehow they managed to provide it. But for the second year, the parliament 
immediately blocked it." The contradictory situation was further explained by NG02. He argued, “Formally, the 
Local Governments cannot allocate maintenance allocation if the formality (asset transfer) has not been done, even 
though actually (with) governor discretion it can be done, if they are brave. However, the nature of politic does not 
work that way.” The discretion denoted by NG02 was that the head of government might actually issue an 
instruction to provide allocation for the maintenance of road assets accepted from the third party as grants, as 
stipulated in the Regulation of Ministry of Home Affairs no 17/2007 article 19 (Regulation of MoHA, 2007). 
However, since such an action might provoke political disputes, the authority was not exercised. The above situation 
indicates that the political willingness, and the consideration on the political stability plays a major role in 
determining budget allocation for road maintenance.  
3.2. Socio-Economic Impact 
Whilst the above sections have provided an in-depth discussion on the impact of the local political condition to 
the capacity of the Local Government in the maintenance of road infrastructure, this section will accordingly 
describe the impact of the socio-economic condition to the road maintenance.  
3.2.1. Distribution of wealth  
As a response to the road maintenance problems, Heggie (2003) suggests that road need to be managed 
professionally and treated as a business. Practically, this suggests that the Local Governments should only build 
roads that can be maintained, and to maintain what have been built. This argument leads to the recommendation to 
establish independent road authorities and the adoption of the road fund mechanism as a sustainable source of the 
maintenance fund (De Richecour and Heggie, 1995, Potter, 1997, Zietlow and Bull, 1999), and the involvement of 
private companies for the operational or the ownership of road infrastructure (Carpenter et al., 2003, Ozbek and 
Jesus, 2007, IndII, 2010). Nevertheless, the poor awareness on the road maintenance needs and the high political 
interest on the construction of new roads were also affected by the social condition of the areas. As highlighted by 
ADB (2003), in the developing countries, roads are regarded as an essential public service and therefore the rational 
economic decision-making rules may not be applied. Hence, adopting the rational approach of prioritising road 
maintenance over the equal distribution of access may not be well perceived in the case study districts.  
Additionally, there seems to be an informal consensus between the road authorities that the development of road 
infrastructure had to be translated as expanding the road networks to the maximum level possible. The Local 
Governments were more focused on building new roads and upgrading gravel roads to asphalt pavement as a means 
to provide the equal right to access to the community. As expressed by NG04, in the development planning, the 
governments were often faced with the dilemma between distributing wealth (expanding road networks) and setting 
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up development priority principle (maintaining existing networks). PG03 argued that this was affected by the many 
unpaved roads at the district level. The pressure was particularly higher where some areas in the districts were still 
isolated. As justified by LG08, referring to the isolated community in the district, “How can we maintain, whilst 
here (in the isolated area) it is very contrast, they do not even have roads."   
Explaining such a condition, Donnges et al. (2007) also add that the developments of rural networks are vital to 
the development of the agricultural sector which would lead to the economic improvement of the area. From the 
socio-economic perspective, the local road authority was also exposed to the pressure from the community to 
disperse road projects to different locations as a means of distribution of wealth. This is probably the view perceived 
by the Local Governments. Limiting the road networks to the maintainable scale may restrict the potential economic 
growth. Even though Donnges et al. (2007) recognise the importance of the impact of rural road development to the 
economy, however, they further argued that two basic measures need to be in place in a decentralised road 
management system, namely the provision of basic minimum of fund for the road maintenance, and the adequate 
capacity to spend the fund effectively.  
3.2.2. Community’s lack of sense of ownership 
In addition to the issue of wealth distribution, the community was also argued to have lacked the sense of 
ownership to the road networks that have been built in their neighbourhoods. Being a contractor, CT02-PROV stated 
that the community frequently disturbed the projects in their area by proposing irrational requests. The irrational 
requests commonly took place in form of forceful demand to work as the project labour, or as the supplier of the 
construction materials, which often came with higher prices. LG02 further gave an example where farmers 
frequently dumped the waste from cleaning the rice paddy fields on the road shoulders, blocking the road drainage 
and increasing the road deterioration rate. He further explained that efforts had been done to educate the community 
regarding the importance of road maintenance. However, the practice seemed to remain.  
Regarding the sense of ownership of individuals towards an organisation, Pierce et al. (2001) propose that 
psychological ownership emerges from three major routes; intimately know the target, controlling the target, and 
investing the self into the target. Supporting the above view, by observing the rural water infrastructure development 
in Kenya, Marks and Davis (2012) conclude that community members’ sense of ownership could be stimulated by 
involving the community in the key decision making, contributing towards the capital cost of the construction, 
participation in the planning and construction activities. In the case studies, the aforementioned key components to 
stimulating the sense of ownership of the community appeared to be lacking. Being a disaster response, most 
reconstruction projects were funded by the government or donor agencies. Accordingly, creating the sense of 
ownership through the community contributions of the capital cost seem to be irrelevant. Furthermore, recruiting the 
community as labour for the project was not always rational or practical. This was mainly because the community 
may not have the required skills, and that road projects commonly run through a number of villages which makes 
recruiting different personnel for different sections of the road project may not be applicable.  
On the other hand, as suggested by the interviewees, the lack of community sense of ownership also appeared to 
be a result of the exclusive road reconstruction process. CO04-NAT drew an example where the traditional farmers 
in the rural areas smashed the drainage channel along the roadside to make water inlets for their farms. The local 
farmers were used to get water for their farms from the irrigation and drainage channels along the road shoulders. 
When the road was rehabilitated, the drainage channel was upgraded from soil to concrete embankment. Apparently, 
the new drainage construction did not provide water inlets to the farming areas. Some spots were therefore destroyed 
for the water inlets by the local farmers. It appeared that there had been lacked of communication and stakeholders’ 
involvement in the reconstruction process. The farmers’ dependence on the drainage channel had not been 
accounted for or alternative sources of water were not introduced to the farmer in the planning and design phase. 
This flaw eventually led to farmers forcefully breaking the drainage wall as the solution for their farming needs.  
3.2.3. Economic consideration 
In addition to the social pressure, economic consideration also contributed to the road deterioration and road 
maintenance capacity. One of the main causes of the road rapid deterioration is related to the structural bearing 
capacity which is affected by the vehicle axle loading capacity. Road is structurally design to cope with a certain 
vehicle axle loading capacity. In Indonesia, the vehicle maximum axle loading capacity allowed for class III roads, 
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the lowest road class, is set to be at eight tons (Law, 2009a, article 19), even though in certain circumstance, the 
vehicle maximum axle loading capacity may be set to a lower limit. Eventually, this resulted in confusion between 
the public works agency as the agency which was responsible for the construction and the transportation agency 
which was responsible to control and enforce the traffic loading capacity limit. This condition frequently led to 
unsolved disputes between the two agencies (Bappeda Jatim, 2011, Dewi and Maris, 2014).  
The West Coast area of Aceh province where Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, and Aceh Barat Daya are located, is 
mainly occupied by palm oil agricultural industry and the mining industry. As a result, trucks and other vehicles 
transporting the heavy loads accordingly need to transport the resources to the processing plants or ports through the 
district roads, before they get to the larger provincial or the national road. This activity consequently and greatly 
contribute to the rapid deterioration of the road networks, particularly when the roads are not structurally designed to 
cope with the heavy load. Furthermore, NG04’s suggested that the Local Governments were facing a dilemmatic 
position. On the one hand, the agricultural and mining industry was necessary to help improve the economic 
condition of the areas. On the other hand, however, ignoring the heavy loaded vehicles will damage the 
infrastructure. NG04 also added that, in reality, the Local Governments tended to ignore this problem and was more 
focused on the direct income that the industry may provide to the district. As a solution to this issue, it was argued 
that the Local Governments should be in charge and lead the process of enforcing the maximum axle loading 
capacity regulation. This is particularly due to the involvement of several institutions in the road management. 
However, enforcing traffic regulation is not only a matter of a dilemma between business investment and the 
damage to road infrastructure.  
3.2.4. Corruption 
The report of the Transparency International on the global corruption perception lists Indonesia as the 114 out of 
the 117 countries surveyed in the 2013 report (Transparency International, 2013). Accordingly, as revealed by 
LG04-BA, the Local Governments acknowledged the corruption practice in their institution. Unfortunately, it 
appeared that the Local Governments’ response to the corruption was rather to control than to diminish. Meanwhile, 
the transaction cost of the capital works can reach from 5 to 20 percent due to corruption (World Bank, 2009) and 
that every dollar’s worth of stolen materials may lead to reduced returns to the project as much as $3.41 (Kenny, 
2007). The World Bank (2009) also adds that the corruptions in the capital works are most obviously detected in the 
process of selecting and awarding the contract in form of bribes and kickbacks, bid rigging, and fraud. 
Moreover, not only did corruption occur in the construction phase, it was also experienced in the traffic loading 
control. The traffic loading control is particularly implemented by operating the weighing stations. However, the 
traffic loading control cannot be enforced due to the corrupted operators. As revealed by PG04, working as one of 
the weighing station operators has been one of the most favourite positions among the transportation agency’s staff 
due to its corruptibility. Regarding this issue, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggest that the practice of corruption 
spreads as a result of competition between both officials and the consumers. They further conclude that competition 
between officials to get a job trough ‘auction’ mechanism will assure that maximal bribes are collected.  
In accordance with the above comments, a joint report of the World Bank and BRR (2006) indicates that there 
are four forms of illegal payment that truckers coming into and going out of Aceh province have to pay, namely, 
police and military post, weighing stations, convoy fees, and the ‘Facilitation’ agencies. The police and military post 
and convoy fees were less relevant to this study as they are mainly fees charged by police and military troops for 
truckers transporting goods without legal documents such as scrap metals and plastic. What are more relevant to this 
road maintenance issue are therefore the illegal extortion collected by the weigh station operators and the 
‘facilitation’ agencies.  
The report concludes that payments at the weigh stations have been the largest illegal charges for truck drivers. In 
the weigh station, truckers needed to pay around Rp 20,000 (£1) per overweight ton. This practice continues to 
occur regardless the national Law no 22/2009 article 307 which stipulates that overweight vehicles should be 
brought to court and may be imprisoned for a maximum period of 2 months or Rp 500,000 ($25) in fine. As 
expected, it was argued that none of the charges' income went into the government treasury (World Bank and BRR, 
2006). The ‘facilitation’ agencies fee, on the other hand, are fees collected by mafia-like freight transporter 
organizations which provide reduced overweight charges for its members when they pass the weighing stations. A 
collusion between the organizations with the transportation agencies' personnel in the weighing stations had been 
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arranged. While some agencies provide a fixed rate of Rp 50,000 – Rp 70,000 (£2.50 - £3.50) regardless the amount 
of overweight loads, some others offer a reduced rate of Rp 10,000 (£0.50) per overweight ton. Both models require 
monthly membership fees of around Rp 25,000 – Rp 50,000 (£1.25 - £2.50) and distribute the truckers with stickers 
to be attached in the front windscreen that the weighing station personnel can immediately recognize.  
Interviewee NG01 further described how the issue of corruption affected the decision-making process with 
regard to the road maintenance and road management in general. Particularly addressed to the development of the 
road information management system, he argued that the idea to develop a proper GIS-based system for road 
maintenance have been proposed and initiated during the post-disaster reconstruction period. As argued by NG01, 
the system would allow the road authorities to provide a strong basis to justify the maintenance needs in their budget 
proposal. Regardless the benefit of adopting such a system, however, NG01 later explained that the proposal for 
development and utilization of the road information management system was rejected by the Local Governments, 
alleging that it was based on the reduced chances and opportunity for corruption.   
4. Conclusion 
The reconstruction of the Indian Ocean tsunami in Aceh resulted in more than 3600 km of roads rehabilitated and 
reconstructed. The responsibility to maintain most of the road infrastructure assets are currently under the Local 
Governments, since most of the reconstructed roads were district roads. Due to the massive investment in the road 
sector, there are concerns over the maintenance of the assets, particularly when the capacity of the Local 
Governments in the road maintenance had been renowned to be poor. Based on the semi-structured interviews with 
twenty-eight respondents representing the disaster management agency, public works, the regional development 
planning, donor agency, as well as the contractors and the consultants working in the road sectors, the impacts of the 
local political and socio-economic condition to the capacity of the Local Governments in the road maintenance have 
been identified. From the political aspect, the political pressure and intervention posed by the parliament as part of 
its budgeting authority has affected the effectiveness of the development planning. In another case, the high 
preference on the capital project has led to wasted investment and road maintenance neglect. The political stability 
appears to be the more important consideration than maximizing and optimising the value of the investment made in 
the road sector.  
From the socio-economic aspect, the political and social pressure to distribute project locations despite the low 
priority and necessity have resulted in reduced effectiveness of the budget expenses. The lack of sense of ownership 
of the community towards the road infrastructure, and the exclusive road development plan, have contributed to the 
rapid deterioration of road infrastructure. Additionally, the need to improve the economic condition of the region 
and the immediate income provided by the industries obstruct the long-term goal of road infrastructure investment. 
These road maintenance capacity issues are eventually worsened by the corruption problems, which is experienced 
in the traffic loading control and the implementation of the road maintenance works.  
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